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Summary 
This paper focuses on the emergence of an institutional innovation along with the diffusion of 
Genetically Modified Soybean in Brazil. It results in private governance which is somehow effective 
by ensuring a kind of win-win situation for the involved players, at least in the short run, as long as 
co-existence still remains. This co-existence is under threat because of the lack of real market 
premium for conventional soybean. 
1.  Introduction 
This paper focuses on the emergence of an institutional innovation along the diffusion of Genetically 
Modified soybean (GMS) in Brazil and on its potential implications in segregating Conventional 
Soybean (CS) from GMS. The present paper pertains to a research work initiated in 2005 and which 
is benefiting from some enhancement through the implementation of a new Project called 
GICOGM
1. 
2.  Institutional innovation in royalties collection in Brazil 
In Brazil, the situation is particular in the sense that the diffusion of GMS has taken place prior to its 
official authorization. It has given rise to an institutional innovation to recover the technology fee 
simply called "royalties" in the country. In the opposite of the common fee recovery system
2, 
Monsanto has issued two complementary ways of royalty collection which both are related to the 
warehousing stage. The first way is adapted to the case where producers buy GMS seeds with 
registered retailers. In this case, producers are requested to pay for royalties which in return give 
them the right of marketing pre-established amounts of grains (crédito de isenção). These amounts 
fluctuate somehow between production regions, taking into account productivity differentials [2]. 
The second way is adapted to the case where farmers have not paid at the seed buying stage (for 
                                                 
1 Gouvernance Internationale du Commerce des OGM, project funded by the French Agency of Research 
2 In many countries, the diffusion of GM seeds has taken place along with a specific three-facet institutional 
innovation: a surcharge to the seed price called “technology fee”, a formal contractual commitment not to hold back 
seeds from one season to another, and to implement some recommended techniques. The recovery of the 
biotechnology royalties takes place at the yearly stage of seed renewal. The commercialization of the GM seeds hence 
is illustrative of the approach of customizing a “new” good [1]. These procedures although frequent nevertheless are 
not general. In China, farmers do not have to pay for any specific technology fee. In India, we find that regulation is 
possible with the Government forcing Monsanto and its local allies to price down seeds by 50%. various reasons) In this case; they must pay royalties at 2% of the value of the grains they sell, or 3% 
if the grains are found GM in spite of the producers' declaration. In practice, farmers seem to revisit 
their preference for the second option of payment at warehousing stage
3 because the percentage of 
royalties is felt high. 
3.  Private governance or case of monopolist abuse? 
The public governance in using GMS hence is unclear if not confusing. This is particularly true with 
regard to the preservation of the farmers' right in using seeds from their production
4. These rules do 
not refer to governance imposed by Monsanto alone but they rather illustrate an alliance between 
players with mutual incentives. Grain collectors indeed gain, 15% of the royalties collected on behalf 
of Monsanto, although they are frequently reluctant to elaborate on this point. On their side, 
producers themselves find normal to pay for technological progress. The first feature of the 
institutional innovation hence is its effectiveness through the creation of kind of win-win situation to 
most of the stakeholders involved. It is nevertheless mitigated by the second feature of lack of 
transparency and unilateral monitoring of the rules. So far, there is only one document pointing out 
the rules in royalty payment [2] and whose content besides is no longer so much valid
5. 
4.  Induced product segregation: technical and economic constraints 
The institutional innovation in the recovery of GMS royalties has implied a systematic control of the 
GM (if more than 5% of the grains have the GM trait) or conventional nature of the grains forwarded 
for warehousing purpose. Where segregation is implemented to separately sell conventional 
soybean, the GM nature threshold is 0.1%, stricter than the European threshold of 0.9%. This 
systematic control fulfils the first requirement of segregation but it is not sufficient to achieve 
segregation to its end. Technical constraint is of limited extent as compared to economic one since 
no real premium for CS (non-GM) is offered by the final buyers in spite of the actions to promote it 
[3, 4]. Under the current situation, the segregation is economically senseless and risky. The unique 
rationale for still using conventional soybean cultivars is the lack of super-early cultivars which are 
GM, but this lack should be compensated soon. 
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3 This option indeed enables them not to pay too much when the yield they eventually get is lower than anticipated. 
4 This right is consistent with the UPOV protection Brazil has officially opted for, but not with the gene patenting. 
5 For instance, farmers have discovered recently that the "marketing right" has limited time validity, till Decembre 31
st 
of each year.  
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